



Family Ownership and Firm Performance, effects of good capitalism and bad capitalism in South America

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Introduction

This research project compares the financial performance of family firms and / with non-family firms in a series of emergent countries and introduce the institutional quality concept.

Two ideas:

1. Family firms are more profitable than non-family firm.
2. The institutional quality affects the result of the firms as well as the entrepreneurs' supply and family firm stability.



Objectives

The objectives of this investigation are the following:

- ▶ Compare the family firms performance with the non- family firms in a sample of South American countries. (6 countries)
- ▶ Study the effects that institutions cause in the countries when they have better or worse institutional quality



Contributions

1. Introduce the risk dimension concept to the performance in a family firm.
2. The research included a bigger data collection.
3. Incorporation of the institutional quality concept.



Methodology

- ▶ How do I classify family and non-family firms?
- ▶ Public and Private data
- ▶ Quantitative data
- ▶ Proxys:
 1. Financial Performance: ROA
 2. Institutional quality: Baulmol's theory Productive and unproductive entrepreneurs.



Hypothesis

- ▶ **Hypothesis 1.** The family firms listed in the South American stock markets are more profitable than non-family firm. It is expected that the family firms show a major performance than non-familiar firm.
- ▶ **Hypothesis 2.** The returns of the family firms on emerging markets exhibit a greater variance than returns of non-family ones.
- ▶ **Hypothesis 3.** After measuring risk, the difference in profitability between family and non-family firms disappears.
- ▶ **Hypothesis 4.** The institutional quality affects the result of the firms as well as the entrepreneurs' supply and family firm stability. In order to improve the quality of the institutions better entrepreneurs and family firms have to exist.



Variables of the model

- ▶ Financial performance and control variable

$$ROA_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 \text{Size}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Age}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Debt}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Dfam}_{it} + U_{it}$$

$$t = 1995, 1996, \dots, 2009 \quad i = \text{firm}$$

- ▶ Variables about the institutional quality.

$$I\&D = \alpha_i + \beta_1 \text{IQuality} + \beta_2 \text{Commercial} + \beta_3 \text{Unemployment}_t + \beta_4 \text{Publicexpens} + U$$

$$\text{Patents} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 \text{IQuality} + \beta_2 \text{Commercial} + \beta_3 \text{Unemployment}_t + \beta_4 \text{Publicexpens} + U$$

$$\text{Capital access} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 \text{IQuality} + \beta_2 \text{Commercial} + \beta_3 \text{Unemployment}_t + \beta_4 \text{Publicexpens} + U$$



Variables of the model (2)

- ▶ Variables about the institutional quality.

$$\text{Corruption} = \alpha_i - \beta_1 \text{IQuality} + \beta_2 \text{Comm} + \beta_3 \text{Unemployment}_t + \beta_4 \text{Publicexpens} + U$$

$$\text{Judicial Indep} = \alpha_i - \beta_1 \text{IQuality} + \beta_2 \text{Comm} + \beta_3 \text{Unemployment}_t + \beta_4 \text{Publicexpens} + U$$

$$\text{Civil Liberties} = \alpha_i - \beta_1 \text{IQuality} + \beta_2 \text{Comm} + \beta_3 \text{Unemployment}_t + \beta_4 \text{Publicexpens} + U$$



Preliminary Results

Data

Financial performance

Institutional quality



Limitations

Data base

Proxy

Time line



Timeframe

6 MONTHS

From april to november

